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BOOK REVIEWS

Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, by Thomas P. Flint. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. xi + 258. $35.00.

WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College
Thomas Flint's Divine Providence: The Molinist Account sets a new standard for the discussion of its topic, a standard that will not soon be surpassed or even easily equaled. The book combines rigorous logical
analysis and ingenious proofs with a lucid, highly readable style and an
engaging sense of humor. (Many readers may learn here for the first
time of the Vatican cattle ranch in Montana, where visitors are advised
to be circumspect so as to avoid being set upon by the papal bulls.)
The first chapter presents the "twin bases of Molinism," namely the
traditional conception of divine providence and libertarian free will.
The traditional conception of providence combines divine foreknowledge and sovereignty in reaching the conclusion that God is "knowingly
and lovingly directing each and every event and each and every creature
toward the end he has ordained for them" (p. 12). Flint has no difficulty
in showing that such a conception has been widely held in the Christian
tradition, and he appeals both to religious tradition and to philosophical
argument in building a case for libertarianism. The combination of the
two he terms "libertarian traditionalism," and he maintains that for the
orthodox Christian it is "if not the only, then at least the best game in
town" (p 34).
Notoriously, difficulties have been encountered in reconciling free
will with the divine control of all events. Enter, in chapter 2, the Molinist
account of providence, which shows how God can indeed control the
course of affairs without interfering with human freedom. God can do
this because of his knowledge of the" counterfactuals of creaturely freedom," which inform him what each free creature would do in any choice
situation with which it might be confronted; thus God can leave the
creatures free while taking no chances whatever concerning what they
may do with their freedom. In this chapter Flint elaborates the Molinist
position with a good deal of philosophical imagination: we learn of the
four "moments" of divine knowledge, of creaturely world-types, of
galaxies of possible worlds, and of possible worlds which are feasible or
infeasible, chosen, rejected, or culled.
The third chapter addresses the main alternatives to the Molinist conception of providence, namely Thomism and the "open view" of God.
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"Thomism" as used here refers, in a general sense, to all varieties of theological determinism; a Protestant might well have spoken instead of
"Calvinism." The "open view" is so called from the book, The Openness
of God l ; its most characteristic affirmation is that God's providential governance of the world is not guided by comprehensive foreknowledge of
the consequences of his actions. In a word, God is a risk-taker.
According to Flint, these are the only significant alternatives available to
an orthodox Christian; he rightly maintains that neither "simple foreknowledge" (foreknowledge without middle knowledge) nor the "eternity solution" represents a distinct alternative. The reason for this is,
that the divine knowledge of the future posited by simple foreknowledge is of no use whatever to God in his providential governance of the
world, and the same is true of the timeless knowledge of the future possessed by God according to the doctrine of divine timelessness. 2 The
doctrine of timelessness can however be combined with theological
determinism (as it is by most Thomists) or with middle knowledge; in
principle, then, timelessness is neutral between the three views of providence, rather than constituting a distinct alternative on its own.
Having set out the alternatives, Flint argues for the preferability of
Molinism. Broadly speaking, Thomism is rejected because it is not libertarian, and the open view is rejected because it is not traditional. (We
will return to one aspect of this discussion later on.) It is noteworthy
that, while Flint's book contains a good deal of insightful, even scintillating, philosophical analysis, the positive case for Molinism is based
almost entirely on theology. Indeed, Flint goes so far as to tax his fellow
Roman Catholics who affirm the open view (such as Richard Pur till and
the late Peter Geach) with the question, "whether or not they think
solemn pronouncements by ecumenical councils are binding on their
faith, and, if not, what (if anything) they think is binding, and why" (p.
l02n). Philosophically, there are at least two notable omissions - matters one might have expected to see addressed which are passed over in
silence. First, there is no positive metaphysical case made for the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom, and no attempt at an explanation of how God can know them assuming they exist.' The closest we
come to this is the observation that ordinary people often accept (in
effect) the existence of such truths. For example, no one objects that the
story of the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come in Dickens' A Christmas
Carol is impossible on the grounds that there can be no truths of the sort
that are being revealed to Scrooge - truths about what would occur were
Scrooge to continue in his present course of life. This may be so, but
such considerations don't amount to much as support for the metaphysical possibility of such truths. As Flint recognizes, we find tales of time
travel both enjoyable and apparently coherent, but most philosophers
consider time travel to be metaphysically impossible.
The second noteworthy omission is Flint's failure to offer any solution
to the problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom for creatures. This is surprising for several reasons: Molinism is
just as vulnerable to this objection as is any other theory of divine foreknowledge; Flint has written on this topic in the past; and there are dif-
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ferent possible solutions which have different implications for the theological problems he addresses in the last section of the book.
The next four chapters are occupied with different kinds of objections
to Molinism and middle knowledge. Chapter 4 considers some traditional Thomistic attacks, while chapter 5 is devoted to the "grounding"
objection: What, if anything, is the basis for the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom - what makes them true? After several pages of preliminary sparring Flint comes to what he takes to be the most serious form
of this objection - and to the best answer to it. A standard view, which
Flint accepts, holds that a counterfactual is true if and only if its consequent is true in the world closest to the actual world in which the
antecedent is true. The "grounds" for the truth of the counterfactual,
then, lie in that "closest possible world" to the actual world. So
a counterfactual such as (c --7z) is grounded only if Z would be
grounded if c were true - in other words, only if, in the nearest
world in which the agent in question is in c, she grounds z - say,
by performing action Z. But if the agent is truly free then aren't
there worlds in which she is in c and refrains from performing Z
that are just as close to our world as any world in which she is in c
and performs Z? If a Z-less world is just as close to the actual world
as is a Z-ful one, then the claim that z would be grounded if she
were in c is false; and if it is false, then our biconditional entails
that (c --7z) is ungrounded.
In response to such an objection, Molinists can probably do no
better than repeat the point made years ago by Plantinga that, in
comparing worlds, one point of similarity is similarity regarding
counterfactuals .... [I]f, as Plantinga contends, "one feature determining the similarity of worlds is whether they share their counterfactuals," then the Z-ful world may well be more similar to the
actual world due to the fact that, both in it and in the actual world,
(c --7z) is true, whereas the same counterfactual is false in the relevant Z-less worlds (pp. 135-36).
This passage would seem to admit of paraphrase as follows: The counterfactual (c --7z) is true in the actual world because z is true in the world
nearest the actual world in which c is true, and that world is nearest to
the actual world because it shares with the actual world the counterfactual (c --7z)! But this appears to be an unusually clear case of circular
explanation - or "circular grounding" - and there is no reason to suppose such a circle would be virtuous rather than vicious. Molinists,
however, are well aware of the threatening circle, and take some pains
to avoid it. Flint, for instance, has told me in correspondence that while
there is a sense in which "the counterfactual ( c --7z) is true in the actual
world because z is true in the world nearest the actual world in which c
is true," the "because" in this sentence, correctly understood, is not
explanatory. And if it is not, there is no vicious explanatory circle. But
one may ask, if the "because" in that sentence is not explanatory, then
what becomes of the answer to the grounding objection? Yet Flint, in
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the passage quoted above, seems clearly to be presenting what he takes
to be an answer to that objection. However we may finally interpret
Flint's position, the following dilemma seems inescapable: If comparative similarity among possible worlds does not provide the grounding
for the truth of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then we have
been given no answer whatever to the grounding objection. If on the
other hand comparative similarity does provide such grounding, then
the charge of vicious circularity returns in full force.' Flint may be looking for a way to escape between the horns of this dilemma, but I don't
think he can avoid being impaled on one or the other.
The next two chapters (6 and 7) are occupied with objections to middle
knowledge put forward by me and by Robert Adams. Thave recently discussed these objections," and will refrain (no doubt to the relief of both
editor and readers!) from repeating myself here. Flint has mounted a concerted counter-attack against these arguments, a counter-attack that he
considers entirely successful. Tdisagree, but I must admit that at present I
see no way to make further progress in resolving this disagreement, or to
compel the Molinist to concede the soundness of the anti-Molinist arguments. On this topic, readers must reach their own conclusions.
The final section of the book deals with four specific issues concerning providence - papal infallibility, predictive prophecy, unanswered
prayer, and "praying for things to have happened." It is widely recognized, even by non-Molinists, that Molinism, if true, should make an
important contribution to our understanding of God's providential governance of the world. But as Flint observes, Molinists have often limited
themselves to issuing promissory notes, whereas his view is that "the
time for cashing in such notes has come," and he presents these chapters
as "early installments in the redemption plan" (p. 180). It is in this section that Flint's originality comes most to the fore: so far as I am aware,
nothing comparably detailed has been attempted before by anyone from
Molina on down. Interestingly, it turns out to be more difficult to give
Molinist accounts of these aspects of providence than one might have
expected. Special difficulties arise at a number of points, to which Flint
finds suitably ingenious solutions. Whatever one's view of these solutions, he surely is right in wanting Molinists to move on from an "obsession with defense" (p. 179) and to show how their doctrine illuminates
concrete issues such as these.
This discussion will conclude with some remarks about the problem of
evil, and about the contrast on this issue between Molinism and the open
view of God. Flint questions my claim (which is supported by both Adams
and Plantinga) that the open view is better placed than Molinism to deal
with this problem.6 He claims, on the contrary, that "all things considered,
God's lacking middle knowledge would make the problem of evil even
more difficult for the Christian to handle. For if God knows only probabilities, then he takes enormous risks in creating significantly free beings: he
risks creating a world in which many, or most, or even all of his free creatures consistently reject him, a world in which they use their freedom to
degrade others and themselves. It seems to me that one can reasonably
argue that a good and loving God would not take such a risk" (p. 107). In
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response to this, I invite Flint to consider the actual world, in which not all
(God be thanked!), but certainly many and perhaps most of our fellow-creatures "consistently reject him, ... [and] use their freedom to degrade others
and themselves." And now consider this question: is this situation easier to
reconcile with the goodness and love of God if we suppose that every particll-

lar instance of evil and suffering was specifically planned and ordained by God to
occur?? Or is it better to say that God has indeed taken risks in creating this
world, and that God's heart is deeply grieved at the grave misuse many of
us make of our freedom?
The Molinist view of providence presents to us the idea of a world that
is, in certain respects, remarkably safe; it is a world in which, "down to the
smallest detail, things are as they are because God knowingly decided to
create such a world" (p. 75). In such a world, we think, there may indeed
be many things whose reasons we do not understand. After all, who are
we to claim to plumb the secrets of the divine counsels? But there will be,
there can be, nothing ultimately without a good reason, nothing which does
not, in the end, playa constructive role in the wise and good plan God has
for the world.
Without doubt, many Christians would like to believe we live in such a
world, and find comfort in the thought that we do. That everything that
ever happens has its good and sufficient reason in the divine plan, and
thus nothing is ultimately to be regretted (though many things may cause
us regret in our present, inevitably short-sighted, view of things) - that
this should be so is a source of comfort to many. Until, that is, a truly horrendous example of evil confronts us, such as the case of Zosia, a young
Jewish girl in the Warsaw ghetto, whose eyes were literally ripped from
their sockets by Nazi soldiers for their own amusement.' Isn't there is
something obscene about supposing that there is some "greater good" in
terms of which such an enormity can be justified? The New Testament, in
contrast, does not view the world as a safe place. On the contrary: as Greg
Boyd has recently reminded us, the world is seen to be a war zone, and in a
war zone atrocities and horrendous evils are the norm rather than the
exception. The ultimate victory of God's cause is not in doubt, but at present that victory for the most part is not evident to us. Our God is a fighting
God, one whose arm is strong and whose final triumph cannot be prevented - but in the meantime, much can and does happen that is contrary to
his loving will and purpose for his creatures. It is this vision of God, and
his providence, that the open view of God seeks to capture.9
NOTES
1. Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David
Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding
of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
2. For argument, see my God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), chapter 3. We thus see that, from a certain point of
view, the denial of comprehensive divine foreknowledge, which is by far the
most controversial aspect of the open view, is not essential to it. Some adherents of simple foreknowledge, such as Nicholas Wolterstorff, hold conceptions
of providence extremely similar to that of the open view of God, and the same is

BOOK REVIEWS

253

true of Linda Zagzebski, who remains undecided between simple foreknowledge and divine timelessness.
3. In the introduction to his translation of Molina's On Divine Foreknowledge
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Fred Freddoso writes: "I freely admit
that the positive task of elaborating a metaphysical and semantic foundation for
this doctrine [of middle knowledge] is immense and has hardly yet begun" (p.
75). So far as I can tell, Flint's book does little to change this situation.
4. According to Alvin Plantinga, "[W]e can't look to similarity, among possible worlds, as explaining counterfactuality, or as founding or grounding it.
(Indeed, any founding or grounding in the neighborhood goes in the opposite
direction.)" ("Replies," in James E. Tomberlin and Peter van lnwagen, eds.,
Alvin Plantinga, Dordrecht: D. Riedel, 1985, p. 378). Here there is clearly no
vicious explanatory circle, but neither is there an answer to the grounding objection.
5. In "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited," Faith and Philosophy
12:2 (April 1995), pp. 223-36, and "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and
UnequivocaJ, A Response to William Craig," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 57 Oune 1997), pp. 389-93. A correction is needed, however. In the former article I put forward a definition of 'bring about' as follows:
S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case that X,
and (X & H)::::} Y, and -(H::::} Y), and -(-X -1 Y) [where H = the past history of the world up to the moment at which X occurs]
Partly as a result of a criticism of Flint's (see p. 154), I have come to see that
the final clause, '-(-X -1 Y)', is a mistake. That clause expresses the idea that
one should not be said to bring about something that was going to happen anyway. But, upon reflection, that simply is not correct: that something was going
to happen anyway may affect the nature of a person's responsibility for bringing
it about, but it does not change the fact that she brings it about. (If I saw down a
tree that would have fallen in the next windstorm it is still 1, not the wind, that
brings it about that the tree is down.) The corrected formula, then, is
S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case that X,
and (X & H) ::::} Y, and -(H ::::} Y).
6. This point is merely one instance of a more general truth: the more complete and detailed we suppose God's control over earthly events to be, the more
difficult it becomes to reconcile the evils that occur with the love and justice of
God. Thus, I judge the problem of evil to be insoluble for Thomists and other
theological determinists; to be slightly easier, but still extremely difficult, for
Molinists; and to be considerably easier for proponents of the open view of
God. It is of course still easier for process theists, but in order to get this result
they greatly diminish the power of God to affect worldly affairs, something the
open view refuses to do.
7. Note in particular Flint's assertion that "if Judas sins, it is because God
knowingly put him in a set of circumstances in which he would sin, and knowingly refrained from putting him in a set of circumstances in which he would
act virtuously" (p. 118).
8. See Gregory A. Boyd, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict
(Downers Grove, IlL: InterVarsity, 1997), pp. 33-34.
9. My thanks to Thomas Flint for his extremely helpful comments on an
earlier version of this review.

